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I. Introduction
Everyone wants to have cell phone reception wherever they
go. Whether it is to make a call, send a text, receive an email, or
browse the Internet, our appetite for constant connectivity seems
insatiable. Of course, cell phone reception is not a natural
phenomenon that just springs up by itself, but instead requires a
vast array of antennae and towers, sometimes as dense as one for
every ten square miles.1 While these towers make this ubiquitous
and pervasive technology possible, the placement of these towers
is often a controversial matter, particularly in residential
communities with regulatory zoning authority over such
matters.2 Thus, it seems that everyone wants to have cell phone
reception but no one wants cell phone towers. With the passage of
1. See, e.g., Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and
Application of “Personal Wireless Service Facility” Provision of Federal
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(C)(ii), 38 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 379 § 2
(2009) (describing generally how cell phones work and stating that “[c]ities and
regions are divided into cells, typically 10 square miles, each containing a base
station,” which is usually a tower or antenna of some sort); Pinney v. Nokia,
Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 439–40 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing generally how cell phones
work); Marshall Brain, Jeff Tyson & Julia Layton, How Cell Phones Work,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone10.htm/printable (last visited
June 1, 2013) (describing how cell phones work) (cited in Buckman Annotation
and Pinney) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See, e.g., T-Mobile v. W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 799–800 (6th Cir.
2012) (describing a contentious township board meeting where several residents
expressed concern regarding an “ugly tower” that would be placed in their “back
yard[s]” with “emissions harming children”).
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the Telecommunications Act of 19963 (TCA or the Act), Congress
attempted to resolve this inherent tension with 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7),4 which, in part, provides that local zoning authorities
“shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting” personal
wireless facilities, including towers.5 This statutory provision
prohibits localities from instituting blanket bans on all cell phone
towers—obviously—but also prohibits effective, de facto bans.
The trouble, however, is that the courts do not agree on just what
that actually means.
The circuits have split on three different issues surrounding
the interpretation of this clause, subsection (B)(i)(II). The first
circuit split is the threshold issue: whether a single denial of a
cell tower permit can indicate an underlying policy that is an
effective prohibition. Taking the narrowest reading of subsection
(B)(i)(II), the Fourth Circuit has said that this provision only
applies to blanket bans and can never be applied to an individual
zoning denial.6 However, every other circuit that has addressed
this question has ruled that, under the right conditions, a single
denial can be indicative of an effective ban on all cell phone
towers.7 The question, then, shifts to identifying those right
conditions. A general two-pronged analysis has emerged among
the circuits outside of the Fourth. First, the cell phone company
needs to show a significant gap in coverage that the proposed
tower can remedy. Second, the court will look into the feasibility
of other alternative tower sites. If there is a need for the tower,
and the most feasible location is rejected by the locality, most
circuits (outside of the Fourth, of course) would consider this an
effective prohibition.8
The next two circuit splits revolve around this two-pronged
analysis. The second circuit split involves the interpretation of
3. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2012). For the duration of this Note, all in-text
statutory cites are to 47 U.S.C. unless otherwise provided. Also, all in-text cites
to subsections (such as (B)(i)(II) or (B)(v)) relate to subsections of § 332(c)(7)
unless otherwise provided.
5. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
6. See infra Part III.A.1.
7. See infra Part III.A.2.
8. See infra Part III.A.2.
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“significant gap.” The Second and Third Circuits have ruled that
there is no significant gap in coverage if at least one provider can
serve the area with existing facilities (one-provider rule).9 The
First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, as well as the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission), have all
rejected this interpretation and instead judge a significant gap
with respect to an individual service provider’s own coverage
area, not to cellular reception for just any company (own-coverage
rule).10 The third and final circuit split relates to the appropriate
standards for considering other feasible tower locations. The First
and Seventh Circuits consider all factors in judging alternative
sites (no-alternative rule).11 On the other hand, the Second,
Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits only consider the factors on
which the zoning authority based its initial denial (least-intrusive
rule).12
This Note seeks to untangle this triple knot of interrelated
circuit splits, analyzing and critiquing the various circuits’
positions with particular emphasis on the underlying policies of
subsection (B)(i)(II) as well as the fundamental tension that
necessitated this statutory provision—everyone wants reception,
but no one wants towers. Following this introductory Part, Part II
provides a brief overview of the TCA and describes the underlying
collective action problem regarding cell phone towers. That Part
also includes an in-depth analysis of § 332(c)(7) and the policies
and structure it establishes regarding tower siting. Part III lays
out each of the three circuit splits in greater detail, explaining
each possible answer to the three questions. Finally, Part IV
critiques each of the six positions on the circuit splits, seeking to
find a resolution that is most faithful to the text, policies,
structure, pragmatic concerns, and legislative intent behind
§ 332(c)(7).
Ultimately, this Note reaches the conclusion that the twopronged analysis is preferable to the Fourth Circuit’s approach.13
Also, within that framework, a significant gap should be
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.C.1.
See infra Part III.C.2.
See infra Part IV.A.
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determined with respect to an individual carrier’s coverage, not
just the first carrier’s coverage (in other words, the own-coverage
rule over the one-provider rule)14 and the quality of the site
should be judged by the factors upon which the zoning board
based its denial (in other words, least-intrusive rule over the noalternative rule).15
II. Background Law
This Part will provide general information regarding the
collective action problems that plague the issue of cell phone
tower siting. Specifically, the not-in-my-back-yard phenomenon is
particularly pervasive in this field. Then, after a brief look at the
major provisions of the TCA, this Part will conclude with an
examination of the text of § 332(c)(7) as well as an analysis of the
siting regime that it establishes. This, in particular, will focus on
the local–national balance that is struck as well as draw some
helpful analogies to administrative and agency law.
A. Collective Action Problems, Not-in-My-Back-Yard, and Cell
Phone Towers
A collective action problem is one in which the group as a
whole would benefit from a solution, but no one person has the
individual self-interest motivations to pursue that solution
without assurances that every other person will be on board as
well.16 Such problems occur in the provision of public goods,
which are goods that are both nonrivalrous (meaning that one’s
enjoyment does not necessarily preclude another’s enjoyment)
and nonexcludable (meaning that there is no practical way to
prevent another’s enjoyment).17 To overcome such collective
14.
15.
16.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (“Indeed, unless the number of individuals
in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device
to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.”).
17. See id. at 14–15 (defining public goods).
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action problems, there usually needs to be a form of coercion or
some “other special device” to make individuals follow their
greater, common interests rather than their immediate, more
individualized interests.18
The issue of siting a cell phone tower in an area without any
reception is an example of a collective action problem. The public
good is cell phone reception, even though, at first glance, it may
not seem like a public good. Certainly one cannot use a cell phone
without first paying fees to a private carrier, thus excluding
noncustomers. But this only makes cell phone service an
excludable, nonpublic good. What we are concerned with here,
however, is not so much the cellular service itself but the ability
to have that service should you chose to pay the fees. Siting a
tower in a “dead zone” allows for cell phone reception to reach
everyone within range, which is the necessary precursor for the
purchase and use of the nonpublic good, cell phone service.19 With
this distinction made, it is clear that reception is a public good.
The fact that one person has reception in a given area does not
diminish another’s reception nearby, thus making it
nonrivalrous. Also, if A were to have reception, there is nothing
that can be done practically to take away A’s reception without
also taking away B’s as well; thus, reception is also
nonexcludable.
One can generally assume that people in a “dead zone” would
probably prefer to have cellular reception. This, of course, would
require towers, which usually are unpopular in residential areas,
specifically because of a particular variant of the general
collective action problem: the not-in-my-back-yard phenomenon,
or NIMBY.20 This refers to instances in which “local citizens who
18. Id. at 2. Olson also theorized that groups that are sufficiently small can
overcome collective action problems without such devices. See id. at 53–60
(describing collective action problems and small-group dynamics).
19. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing generally how cell
phone towers work).
20. See, e.g., David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to
Which Communities Will Climb to Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J.
CORP. L. 469, 482–83 (1998) (describing NIMBY as “the phenomenon of local
citizens who desire the benefit of essential infrastructure (e.g., nursing homes
and wireless telecommunications facilities), but want them placed in locations
other than their own neighborhoods or communities” (citations omitted)); see
also Robert Long, Note, Allocating the Aesthetic Costs of Cellular Tower
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desire the benefit of essential infrastructure . . . , but want it
placed in locations other than their own neighborhoods.”21
In the case of cell phone towers, the reported cases
demonstrate that phrase “not in my back yard” is particularly
fitting. For example, in T-Mobile Central, LLC v. West
Bloomfield,22 the Sixth Circuit reviewed facts from a contentious
township meeting where “several of the concerned citizens and
members of the Board specifically mentioned their backyards,”
including statements such as:
I need to know if a resident says, you put an ugly tower in my
backyard and you potentially decrease my property value; my
backyard is kind of where they’re going to put this thing; but
the final word is, would you want one of these cell towers in
what would be, if I build a house there or build houses there,
in my backyard?; would you want that in your backyard; there
will be towers and towers and pretty soon I’ll have Disneyland
in my backyard.23

These statements vividly demonstrate the high tensions that
usually accompany a zoning board decision regarding a new cell
phone tower as well as the aptness of the name, not-in-my-backyard. These also show the fundamental tension that underlies
this whole issue: most everyone wants cell reception wherever
they go, but no one wants to pay the costs associated with it.24
One should not lose sight of the fact that the NIMBY sentiment is
nothing if not sympathetic. Not only does a tower nearby have
potential pecuniary effects on home values,25 but it also has
aesthetic and sentimental effects as well. People simply tend to

Expansion: A Workable Regulatory Regime, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 373, 389
(describing NIMBY as “the desire of citizens to benefit from essential
infrastructure, such as hazardous waste disposal facilities, without bearing the
cost of such facilities in their own neighborhoods” (citations omitted)).
21. Hughes, supra note 20, at 482 (citations omitted).
22. 691 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2012).
23. Id. at 800 n.4 (collecting comments from the minutes of the Board
meeting (brackets omitted)).
24. Specifically, the cost can be conceptualized as “visual pollution” or the
fact that the “tower kills the view.” John Copeland Nagle, Cell Phone Towers as
Visual Pollution, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 537, 537 (2009)
(describing one resident’s objection to a tower being placed near his home).
25. See, e.g., T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 800 n.4 (referencing property value).
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be attached to the view from their window.26 The problem is,
however, people are also attached to their cell phones. This is also
where the collective action logic can provide a solution. Mancur
Olson argued that such splits between common and individual
interests regarding public goods could be resolved through
“coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in
their common interest.”27 While local zoning boards have not been
coerced into allowing cell phone towers, Congress did pass the
TCA, which included provisions that operate as a “special device”
in the siting of cellular facilities.
B. Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)
The TCA was “an omnibus overhaul of the federal regulation
of communications companies”28 and extensively revised the
Telecommunications Act of 1934.29 It sought to “provide a procompetitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to
accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services to
all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to
competition.”30 The major provisions include (1) prohibiting state
and local regulations that hinder the provision of
telecommunications services,31 (2) giving the FCC specific
authority to preempt such state and local regulations,32
(3) providing for what would later lead to the Universal Service

26. See supra note 24 (describing one resident’s objection to a tower being
placed near his home).
27. OLSON, supra note 16, at 2.
28. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 637 (2d Cir. 1999).
29. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
30. H. REP. No. 104-458 at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124.
31. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 253(a), 110
Stat. 56, 70 (1996) (“No State or local statute or regulation . . . may prohibit or
have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate
or intrastate telecommunications service.”).
32. See id. § 253(d), 110 Stat. at 70−71 (giving the FCC authority to
preempt such regulations “to the extent necessary to correct such violation or
inconsistency”).
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Fund,33
(4) mandating
“interconnection”
between
34
telecommunications carriers, (5) eliminating some ownership
restrictions on radio and television stations,35 and (6) various
provisions regarding pornography, indecency, and depiction of
violence on various telecommunications platforms, including the
Internet.36
Most importantly for the purposes of this Note, the Act also
provided for a new federal–local cell phone tower siting regime,
now codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).37 This section does not
explicitly preempt local zoning authority with respect to cell
phone towers. Indeed, the section preserves it, but with five
exceptions,38 three substantive and two procedural. These are
federally imposed limitations on local zoning authority and
operate as Olson’s “special device” to address the collective action
issues.39 The first, of course, is the subject of this Note: local
zoning boards cannot institute policies that “prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.”40
33. See id. § 254, 110 Stat. at 71–75 (establishing principles and policies for
universal service activities to expand telecommunications services to
underserved sectors such as rural areas, low-income consumers, schools, etc.);
see also 47 C.F.R. Part 54 (containing various regulations regarding universal
service).
34. See Telecommunications Act §§ 251–52, 110 Stat. at 61–70 (requiring
various forms of interconnection between the systems of market competitors and
providing negotiation and arbitration procedures to force such interconnection).
35. See e.g., id. § 202(a), 110 Stat. at 110 (requiring the FCC to
“eliminate[e] any provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast
stations which may be owned or controlled by one entity nationally”); id.
§ 202(c), 110 Stat. at 111 (requiring the FCC to “eliminate[e] the restrictions on
the number of television stations that a person or entity may directly or
indirectly own . . . nationwide”).
36. See id. §§ 501–61, 110 Stat. at 133–43 (providing for various
prohibitions and restrictions on indecent, obscene, and violent content on cable
television and the Internet). But see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997)
(striking down several portions of the Act relating to Internet pornography as
violative of the First Amendment).
37. See § 704, 110 Stat. at 151.
38. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2012) (“Except as provided in this
paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State
or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service
facilities.”); see also § 332(c)(7)(B) (providing the five exceptions).
39. OLSON, supra note 16, at 2.
40. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
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Second, localities cannot “unreasonably discriminate among
providers of functionally equivalent services.”41 Third, localities
cannot regulate tower sites based on health or environmental
concerns regarding radio waves if the sites comply with FCC
regulations.42 As for the two procedural limitations, zoning
boards must handle cell phone tower site applications “within a
reasonable period of time”43 and any denials of tower sites must
be “in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in
a written record.”44 Finally, as a means to enforce these
limitations through civil litigation, a service provider may file an
“expedited” action in “any court of competent jurisdiction” if any
of these provisions have been violated.45
What is particularly interesting about the § 332(c)(7) regime
is that it allows the substantive decision-making regarding tower
siting to remain largely in local hands, but still provides a federal
procedural check on the system so as to ensure growth of the
nation’s cellular infrastructure.46 While one could easily view this
as Congress’s way of “splitting the baby” between local and
federal control of the issue,47 this accurate yet glib
characterization is much too simple and hides the most
innovative portions of the Act. To fully understand § 332(c)(7),
one must not only keep in mind the local–federal distinction, but
41. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I).
42. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (“No State or local government or instrumentality
thereof may regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal
wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio
frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the
Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions.”).
43. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
44. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
45. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
46. See, e.g., Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc’ns Enters., Inc. 173
F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[Section] 332(c)(7) is a deliberate compromise
between two competing aims—to facilitate nationally the growth of wireless
telephone service and to maintain substantial local control over siting of
towers.”).
47. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Berger, Efficient Wireless Tower Siting: An
Alternative to Section 332(c)(7) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 TEMP.
ENVTL. L & TECH. J. 83, 84 (2004) (“Section 332(c)(7) is an earnest, but
ultimately problematic congressional attempt to ‘split the baby’ between
wireless providers that need towers to expand their networks and some local
zoning boards and residents that view the proliferation of towers as an invasion
of aesthetically displeasing technology upon their homes and lives.”).
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also the substantive–procedural distinction. The Act only
intervenes in the actual substance of the decisions with the three
limitations listed above. The rest, though, is left in the hands of
the zoning authorities in each locality, who must also comply
with the two procedural requirements of reasonable time and
substantial evidence. Thus, for the most part, § 332(c)(7) governs
not what decisions are made, but rather how they are made.48 In
other words, § 332(c)(7) does not answer the collective action
problem, but provides a way—or “special device”49—to address
the collective action problem.
This hybrid system has been described by at least one scholar
as a form of “process preemption” because it federally imposes
“substantive and procedural constraints on the local land use
process.”50 Section 332(c)(7) does not directly mandate any
particular decision on the merits of a tower siting, but rather only
constrains the process by which that decision is reached. 51 Such a
structure has distinct advantages over substantive federal
regulation by an agency. First, it allows a jurisdictional balance
on a traditionally local issue—land-use zoning—that also
happens to have substantial national import—the need for fully
functioning cellular infrastructure.52 Second, this process also
48. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure
Security, and the NIMBY Problem, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 464 (2005)
(describing how the § 332(c)(7) regime “operates not through affirmative federal
rules, but rather through oversight of the operation of state and local land use
decisions”); Robert B. Foster & Mitchell A. Carrel, Tell Me What You Really
Think: Judicial Review of Land Use Decisions on Cellular Telecommunications
Facilities Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 37 URB. LAW. 551, 552
(2005) (“The TCA does not completely preempt local zoning authority, but
instead places certain restrictions on the authority of local bodies to regulate the
zoning of telecommunications service facilities.”); Ashira Pelman Ostrow,
Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 290
(2011) (“This framework empowers local governments to make primary siting
decisions, subject to federal constraints on the decisionmaking process.”).
49. OLSON, supra note 16, at 2.
50. Ostrow, supra note 48, at 290.
51. See id. (“This framework empowers local governments to make primary
siting decisions, subject to federal constraints on the decisionmaking process.”).
52. See id. at 293 (describing how the “hybrid federal–local framework
accounts for the interjurisdictional nature of a federal siting policy, effectively
balancing national and local land use priorities”); id. at 317 (“[T]he TCA’s
Telecommunications Siting Policy utilizes a mix of regulatory actors to balance
national communication goals with legitimate local siting concerns.” (footnote
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allows for substantive changes in the outcomes of decisions (that
is, more zoning approvals for cell phone towers), but in an open
and public way that is consistent and legitimate.53 Instead of
federally promulgated administrative rules regulating tower
siting in all localities across the country,54 the decisions would
still be made at the local level, perhaps leading to more public
acceptance. For example, under this regime, it could not be said
that “Washington bureaucrats” were forcing the small town to
suffer the unsightly tower (or at least not directly forcing).
However, the § 332(c)(7) limitations could still tip the odds more
in favor of the placement of the tower. Moreover, with the
procedural requirements (such as reasonable time55 and
substantial evidence on a written record56), cell phone providers
applying for tower approval will not be subject to long delays and
unexplained denials. These unfortunate possibilities, if allowed to
occur, could call into question the motives of the zoning
authorities and give the impression that the providers are only
getting the runaround and not a fair decision on the merits.57
omitted)).
53. See id. at 293 (“[B]y placing procedural constraints on the local
decision-making process . . . Process Preemption increases the legitimacy,
consistency, and public acceptance of controversial siting decisions.”).
54. This, in fact, was an alternative considered by Congress. The original
House version of the Act would have established a negotiated rulemaking
committee within the FCC to promulgate a set of regulations with which local
zoning boards would have to comply. See H. REP. NO. 104-204, at 25 (1995),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 10 (“Pursuant to subchapter III of title 5,
United States Code, the Commission shall establish a negotiated rulemaking
committee to negotiate and develop a proposed policy to comply with the
requirements of this paragraph.”).
55. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2012) (“A State or local government or
instrumentality thereof shall act on any request for authorization to place,
construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a reasonable
period of time after the request is duly filed with such government or
instrumentality . . . .”).
56. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (“Any decision by a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal
wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial
evidence contained in a written record.”).
57. See, e.g., Eagle, supra note 48, at 493 (“Long delays in making
determinations not only earn skepticism as to underlying motives with respect
to the individual applications, but also lend doubt as to whether delays that
ostensibly are for review of applications in fact are for discrimination among
providers or for prohibitions on wireless service . . . .”).
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The procedural preemption characterization is a helpful way
of understanding the § 332(c)(7) regime, but another metaphor
may be illustrative as well. Specifically, § 332(c)(7) is highly
evocative of judicial review of administrative decisions. For
example, the Act requires that all denials of tower permits be
supported by “substantial evidence contained in a written
record.”58 This appears to facilitate, at least in part, the judicial
review portion of the Act whereby aggrieved service providers can
petition the federal courts for relief from violations of
§ 332(c)(7)(B).59 While the Act does not provide an exact definition
of “substantial evidence,” this phrase does have a wellestablished definition in administrative law.60 In fact, the
legislative history of the Act demonstrates that Congress
intended this phrase to mean the same as it does in the agency
context.61 The cases have generally applied the same
administrative standard.62 Thus, one could view a subsection
58. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
59. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(v); see also PATRICIA E. SALKIN, 4 AM. LAW. ZONING
§ 40:27 (5th ed.) (“If judicial review is to be an efficient bulwark against
arbitrary conduct, such records must be accurate, and reasonably complete.”).
Local zoning meetings are often informal, and records and transcripts are not
always rigorously taken as they would be in a court or agency hearing. See id.
§ 40:1 (generally describing the informal nature of zoning hearings, including
lack of legally trained members, sporadic legal advice, and inconsistent
recordkeeping).
60. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(“[S]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Accordingly, it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to
direct a verdict.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
61. See H. REP. NO. 104-458, at 208 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223 (“The phrase ‘substantial evidence contained in a written
record’ is the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency actions.”).
62. See, e.g., Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cnty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1218
(11th Cir. 2002) (applying the same “substantial evidence” standard from the
administrative context); Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58 (1st
Cir. 2001) (same); Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 227 F.3d 414, 423
(6th Cir. 2000) (same); Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 181 F.3d 403,
407–08 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d
490, 493–94 (2d Cir. 1999) (same). Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit is again an
outlier in its interpretation of the Act. See infra Part III.A.1. for another
anomalous interpretation by the Fourth Circuit. Noting that “[t]he ‘reasonable
mind’ of a legislator is not necessarily the same as the ‘reasonable mind’ of a
bureaucrat,” the Fourth Circuit applies a reasonable-legislator standard to the
definition of substantial evidence for § 332(c)(7) purposes, including
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(B)(v) petition like a court’s review of an agency action under the
Administrative Procedure Act.63 Again, this underscores the fact
that the substantive decision-making is still done, within certain
limitations, by the local zoning board because the reviewing court
“may neither engage in [its] own fact-finding nor supplant the
[zoning board’s] reasonable determinations.”64 Rather, the court’s
role is simply to ensure that the local authorities have complied
with the handful of procedural and substantive limitations found
within § 332(c)(7)(B), including subsection (B)(i)(II)’s prohibition
on bans and effective bans. Thus, with the substantial evidence
requirements and the opportunity for judicial review, § 332(c)(7)
can be seen as Congress treating local zoning boards as miniagencies.65 The metaphor to federal administrative law is
particularly helpful when considering one of the circuit splits
discussed later.66

considerations of popular opinion. AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of
Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998). While the court has a point about
the differences between legislators and bureaucrats, this does not seem to be
enough to trump the legislative history that clearly and unequivocally states
that “substantial evidence” is to be given the same definition that it has in the
administrative context. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . .
unsupported by substantial evidence . . . .”).
64. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir.
1999) (citing PrimeCo Pers. Commc’ns, L.P. v. Vill. of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d
1052, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1998)); see also T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Unified Gov’t of
Wyandotte Cnty., 546 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] reviewing court has
no power to substitute its own conclusions for those of the fact-finder . . . .”
(citations and quotations omitted)); Ostrow, supra note 48, at 333 (“Though the
substantial evidence standard is less deferential than the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, it does not substitute local judgments with those
of the judiciary.”).
65. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (reviewing factual findings with a
substantial evidence on the record as a whole standard), and id. § 702 (offering
right of review to persons suffering legal wrongs), with 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (requiring that denials be supported by substantial evidence in
a written record), and id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (providing judicial review for alleged
violations to any person adversely affected).
66. See infra Part IV.C.
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III. Decisions and Circuit Splits
Speaking generally about the TCA, the Supreme Court has
remarked that the Act is “in many important respects a model of
ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction.”67 Section 332(c)(7) is
no exception to this characterization. Subsection (B)(i)(II) is
indeed ambiguous in that it does not spell out what it means by
“the effect of prohibiting.” While there may not be any selfcontradictions within § 332(c)(7) itself, the federal appellate
courts have conflicting interpretations of just what this crucial
substantive limitation actually means. The courts first differ as to
what extent an individual denial of a siting application can
constitute an effective ban by the local zoning board. From there,
the circuits split again on two issues regarding how to define such
an effective ban. The following subparts explain the three splits
in more detail. For clarification, the table at the end of Part III
summarizes these three splits and how the various courts have
answered the questions.
A. First Split: Can a Single Denial Effectively Prohibit Cell Phone
Towers?
The circuits are split on whether a single zoning decision can
“have the effect of prohibiting” cell phone towers and thus trigger
subsection (B)(i)(II). The Fourth Circuit has determined that a
single denial rarely suffices as an effective prohibition, while
every other circuit that has considered the issue has found that
even one denial, under the right circumstances, can violate
subsection (B)(i)(II).
1. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach: A Blanket Ban on (Only)
Blanket Bans
In AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia
Beach,68
the
Fourth
Circuit
ruled
that
subsection
67. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd. 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).
68. AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423
(4th Cir. 1998).
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(B)(i)(II) operates to prohibit only across-the-board bans on cell
phone towers and has no effect on individual zoning decisions.69
Thus, a single denied application from a zoning authority cannot
violate the Act. Examining the issue in a way that other courts
have called “strict plain meaning analysis”70 and even a “cramped
reading,”71 the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
any reading of subsection (B)(i)(II) that allows the subsection
to apply to individual decisions would effectively nullify local
authority by mandating approval of all (or nearly all)
applications, a result contrary to the explicit language of
section (B)(iii), which manifestly contemplates the ability of
local authorities to “deny a request.”72

The court reasoned that its narrow interpretation of subsection
(B)(i)(II) is “necessary to avoid destroying local authority and to
reconcile subsection (B)(i)(II) with section (B)(iii),”73 which, as the
court mentioned, implicitly presumes that local authorities can
deny requests.74 Thus, because the Act contemplates permissible
denials, the AT&T court determined that a single denial could
never be considered a prohibition on personal wireless services.75
69. See id. at 428 (“The district court . . . held that subsection (B)(i)(II) . . .
only applies to ‘blanket prohibitions’ and ‘general bans or policies,’ not
individual zoning decisions. . . . [W]e reach the same conclusion . . . .” (citations
and quotations omitted)).
70. MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 730 (9th Cir.
2005).
71. T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir.
2012).
72. AT&T, 155 F.3d at 428.
73. Id. at 429.
74. See id. at 428 (stating that “the explicit language of section (B)(iii) . . .
manifestly contemplates the ability of local authorities to ‘deny a request’”); see
also 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2012) (“Any decision by a State or local
government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or
modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by
substantial evidence contained in a written record.” (emphasis added)).
75. See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d
423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998)
[A]ny reading of subsection (B)(i)(II) that allows the subsection to
apply to individual decisions would effectively nullify local authority
by mandating approval of all (or nearly all) applications, a result
contrary to the explicit language of section (B)(iii), which manifestly
contemplates the ability of local authorities to “deny a request.”
The obvious fallacy here is that while a single denial can be permissible as
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In the Fourth Circuit, only “blanket prohibitions” and “general
bans or policies” can violate subsection (B)(i)(II), but never
“individual zoning decisions.”76
While the AT&T decision was fairly rigid in its finding that
only blanket bans could violate subsection (B)(i)(II), the Fourth
Circuit has “since recognized . . . the theoretical possibility” that a
single denial could violate subsection (B)(i)(II) if the only possible
tower site was denied, but the court cautioned that “such a
scenario ‘seems unlikely in the real world.’”77 Despite the court’s
skepticism that such a situation could present itself, the court
has stated that a provider complaining of a single denial has the
“heavy burden” of proving that this is “tantamount to a
prohibition of service.”78 On a few occasions,79 the court has
favorably cited to a First Circuit case80: “[T]he burden for the
carrier invoking [subsection (B)(i)(II)] is a heavy one: to show
from language or circumstances not just that this application has
been rejected but that further reasonable efforts are so likely to
be fruitless that it is a waste of time even to try.”81 The Fourth
Circuit uses this to demonstrate the high hurdle that carriers
must clear, even though the First Circuit uses another, more
lenient analysis that the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejects.82 Thus,
contemplated by the statute, this does not mean that all single denials are
always permissible. This is the critique to be offered in Part IV.A, infra.
76. AT&T, 155 F.3d at 428.
77. USCOC of Va. RSA # 3 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 343
F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting 360 Degrees Commc’ns Co. of
Charlottesville v. Bd. of Supervisors, 211 F.3d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 2000)).
78. 360 Degrees Commc’ns Co. of Charlottesville v. Bd. of Supervisors, 211
F.3d 79, 87–88 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc’ns
Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999)).
79. See, e.g., id. at 88; New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Fairfax Cnty.
Bd. of Supervisors, 674 F.3d 270, 277 (4th Cir. 2012).
80. See Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9
(1st Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 14.
82. Compare Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d
620, 632 (1st Cir. 2002) (“We have concluded that a town’s refusal to permit a
tower that is needed to fill a significant geographic gap in service, where no
service at all is offered in the gap, would violate the effective prohibition clause.”
(citations, quotations, and brackets omitted)), with T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Fairfax
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 672 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e specifically
rejected the standard adopted by other circuits permitting a plaintiff to
establish merely that its proposed facility constitutes the least intrusive means
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although the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged the possibility of a
non-ban effective prohibition, the circuit’s tests are still the most
demanding and are distinct from the other circuits’ tests.
Whether or not the Fourth Circuit’s later precedents indicate a
ban only on blanket prohibitions or perhaps something a shade
more lenient, other circuits certainly view the Fourth Circuit’s
position as the strictest.83
2. Everyone Else’s Approach: A Single Denial Can Constitute an
Effective Prohibition
Every other circuit that has considered the question has
rejected the Fourth Circuit’s strict interpretation of subsection
(B)(i)(II).84 Instead, the other circuits take a more flexible
approach. Although not every individual denial represents an
effective prohibition, a single denial conceivably could under the
right circumstances; that possibility is not foreclosed.85 Under
to close a significant gap in service.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
83. See, e.g., T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Charter Twp. of W. Bloomfield, 691
F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The cramped reading of the Fourth Circuit
requires a blanket ban to trigger a violation of the statute.”).
84. All but the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have directly
considered this issue, and all have reached the opposite conclusion as the
Fourth Circuit in AT&T. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he denial of a single application can
constitute a violation of this portion of the Act.”); MetroPCS v. City & Cnty. of
S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 731 (9th Cir. 2005) (“However, for a variety of reasons, we
decline to adopt the Fourth Circuit rule on this point.”); Voicestream
Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty., 342 F.3d 818, 833 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Other
circuits have determined that the clause is not restricted to blanket bans on cell
towers, and that the clause may, at times, apply to individual zoning decisions.”
(quotations and citations omitted)); Second Generation Props., LP v. Town of
Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 629 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The clause may, at times, apply to
individual zoning decisions.”); APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196
F.3d 469, 479 (3d Cir. 1999) (“This does not mean, however, that a provider can
never establish that an individual adverse zoning decision has the ‘effect’ of
violating § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).”); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630,
640 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Quoting at length from AT&T, the Board argues in
substance that subsection B(i)(II) must be read as prohibiting only general
bans. . . . We disagree with this reasoning.” (citations omitted)).
85. See, e.g., T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 805–06 (“The statute itself refers to
actions that have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless
services . . . . Not simply prohibiting it, but effectively prohibiting it. Thus,
actions short of a complete prohibition could have the effect of improperly
hindering the construction of cellular towers.”).
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this approach, providers instead have to demonstrate that the
one denial in question arises from an underlying policy that is so
against cell phone towers that it has the effect of a ban.86 While
sitting by appointment on the Ninth Circuit, Judge Cudahy aptly
summarized the general approach of all other circuits:
Several circuits have held that, even in the absence of a
“general ban” on wireless services, a locality can run afoul of
the TCA’s “effective prohibition” clause if it prevents a wireless
provider from closing a “significant gap” in service coverage.
This inquiry generally involves a two-pronged analysis
requiring (1) the showing of a “significant gap” in service
coverage and (2) some inquiry into the feasibility of alternative
facilities or site locations.87

Although this may seem to complicate the process significantly—
perhaps more so than the subsection’s plain language would
indicate—the reasoning behind this two-pronged analysis is
actually quite simple: if a zoning authority in a “dead zone”
denies a tower at even the best possible location, then that single
denial is a manifestation of a broader policy that does “have the
effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless services.”88
Essentially, if the best site is not good enough for the zoning
board, then no site will ever be good enough. The next two circuit
splits regard issues within this two-part test.
B. Second Split: How Significant of a Gap?
The second circuit split relates to whether a significant gap
in coverage must exist for all cell phone providers, or whether an
individual company’s gap in only their own service would also
suffice. Consider a hypothetical town in which Verizon has a
tower that provides its customers with good reception. AT&T,
however, does not have a tower in the area and thus its
customers have poor signal. If the local zoning authority denies
86. See, e.g., APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 479
(3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he provider must bring additional proof . . . to demonstrate
that the denial is representative of a broader policy or circumstance that
precludes the provision of wireless service.”).
87. MetroPCS v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 731 (9th Cir. 2005).
88. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (2012).
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AT&T’s tower application and the provider challenges the denial
in federal court under subsection (B)(i)(II), can AT&T argue a
“significant gap” in its own coverage, or does Verizon’s
preexisting tower prohibit this argument? Thus, the circuits split
around the issue of whether a significant gap is with respect to
cellular reception generally or with respect to an individual
provider.
1. The One-Provider Rule
If the above example took place in the Second or Third
Circuits, AT&T’s challenge would fail due to the “one-provider
rule.” These circuits have concluded that “once an area is
sufficiently serviced by a wireless service provider, the right to
deny applications becomes broader: state and local governments
may deny subsequent applications without thereby violating
subsection B(i)(II).”89 The Second and Third Circuits were not
concerned about unchecked zoning authorities with plenary
power to deny all subsequent towers because “[t]he right to deny
applications will still be tempered by subsection B(i)(II), which
prohibits unreasonable discrimination.”90 In reviewing (and
ultimately rejecting) the one-provider rule, the Ninth Circuit
remarked:
This rule has been touted as proceeding from the consumer’s
perspective rather than the individual service provider’s
perspective, which the Third Circuit argues is more in keeping
with the regulatory goals of the TCA—as long as some
provider offers service in the area, consumers will be
adequately served and the TCA’s goal of establishing
nationwide wireless service will be achieved. Under this view,
the TCA protects only the individual user’s ability to receive
service from one provider or another; it does not protect each
service provider’s ability to maintain full coverage within a
given market.91

89. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir. 1999); see
also APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 480 (quoting Willoth).
90. Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643; see also APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 480
(quoting Willoth).
91. MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731–32 (citations and quotations omitted).
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Similarly, after an in-depth analysis of the Act’s statutory
definitions of the various kinds of cellular services,92 the Second
Circuit stated that:
[T]he plain focus of the statute is on whether it is possible for a
user [to have reception]. In our view, therefore, the most
compelling reading . . . is that local governments may not
regulate personal wireless service facilities in such a way as to
prohibit remote users from [having reception].93

Thus, with this consumer-centric view, it is only natural that the
Second and Third Circuits would adopt the one-provider rule.
Although the Fourth Circuit rejects this two-pronged inquiry
altogether,94 the circuit has implicitly accepted the one-provider
rule as well, determining that providers’ individualized causes of
action “would effectively nullify local authority by mandating
approval of all (or nearly all) applications.”95 If AT&T’s challenge
of a single denial is likely to fail in the Fourth Circuit, then
surely the challenge will be all the more likely to fail if Verizon
already has a working tower in the area.
2. The Own-Coverage Rule
Three other circuits, as well as the FCC, have rejected the
one-provider rule. 96 In Second Generation Properties L.P. v. Town
92. See Willoth, 176 F.3d at 641–43 (analyzing the statutory definitions);
see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(C)(i), 332(d) (2012) (defining “personal wireless
services”).
93. Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643 (emphasis added).
94. Instead, the Fourth Circuit takes the position that single denials rarely,
if ever, constitute violations of subsection (B)(i)(II). See supra Part III.A.1.
95. AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423,
428 (4th Cir. 1998).
96. See Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d (1st
Cir. 2002) (“The fact that some carrier provides some service to some consumers
does not in itself mean that the town has not effectively prohibited services to
other consumers.”); see also T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794,
807 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Second Generation); MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 732
(citing Second Generation); Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions
of Section 332(c)(7)(B), 24 FCC Rcd. 13994, 14016–17 (2009) [hereinafter FCC
Ruling] (“[W]e conclude that under the better reading of the statute, this
limitation of State/local authority applies not just to the first carrier to enter
into the market, but also to all subsequent entrants.”).
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of Pelham,97 the First Circuit rejected the one-provider rule on
both statutory–textual and practical–policy grounds. As for the
statutory grounds, subsection (B)(i)(II) speaks of “prohibiting the
provision of personal wireless services,” the plural being crucial to
the court.98 As for the pragmatic implications, the First Circuit
worried that a one-provider rule would carve out separate
enclaves for different cell phone providers based on wherever
their towers were. Town A may have great reception for Verizon
customers but little to offer to AT&T customers. Just a few miles
down the highway in Town B, the situation could be reversed,
with AT&T providing better service than Verizon.99 In Second
Generation, the First Circuit stated that “[t]he result would be a
crazy patchwork quilt of intermittent coverage [that] might have
the effect of driving the industry toward a single carrier.”100 This
would be quite the opposite of the legislation’s stated goal to
“open[] all telecommunications markets to competition.”101
Because of the potential for the “crazy patchwork quilt,” the court
worried that “[t]he fact that some carrier provides some service to
some consumers does not in itself mean that the town has not
effectively prohibited services to other consumers.”102 Even if the
market does not tend toward monopoly, the patchwork is still
problematic. “From the perspective of a customer who has poor
coverage with T-Mobile in a certain area, it is little consolation
that another provider, Verizon for example, may have good
service in the same area.”103 The Sixth104 and Ninth Circuits105
have also accepted the First Circuit’s reasoning on this issue.
97. 313 F.3d 620 (1st Cir. 2002).
98. See id. at 633 (“A straightforward reading is that ‘services’ refers to
more than one carrier. Congress contemplated that there be multiple carriers
competing to provide services to consumers.”).
99. All of this is to say nothing about the out-of-town traveler driving
through with a third carrier like T-Mobile.
100. Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 633.
101. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 1 (1995).
102. Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 634.
103. T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 807 (6th Cir.
2012).
104. See id. (“In light of the FCC’s endorsement of the standards used by the
First and Ninth Circuits, we now adopt this approach.”).
105. See MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 733 (9th Cir.
2005) (“[W]e elect to . . . formally adopt the First Circuit’s rule that a significant
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The FCC was also swayed by this logic. In a 2009 declaratory
ruling, the Commission largely adopted both the plural “services”
argument106 and the patchwork quilt worries.107 Additionally, the
FCC recognized “the possibility that the first carrier may not
provide service to the entire locality.”108 In such a scenario, “a
zoning approach that subsequently prohibits or effectively
prohibits additional carriers therefore may leave segments of the
population unserved or underserved.”109 Finally, in that same
ruling, the FCC also criticized the Fourth Circuit’s blanket-banonly approach.110 Thus, the FCC has come down in favor of the
own-coverage rule as well.
C. Third Split: How to Identify Feasible Alternatives?
The two-pronged test’s logic is that if the zoning authority
denies a petition for even the best possible tower location in a
“dead zone,” then that is effectively a ban on all cell phone
towers. Aside from the issue of whether a significant gap is with
respect to one or any carrier, the circuits also vary on how to
determine the quality of other alternative locations. Specifically,
gap in service (and thus an effective prohibition of service) exists whenever a
provider is prevented from filling a significant gap in its own service coverage.”).
106. See FCC Ruling, supra note 96, at 14017 (“First, our interpretation is
consistent with the statutory language referring to the prohibition of ‘the
provision of personal wireless services’ rather than the singular term ‘service.’”).
107. See id. at 14017–18 (“Our interpretation in this Declaratory Ruling
promotes these statutory objectives more effectively than the alternative, which
could perpetuate significant coverage gaps within any individual wireless
provider’s service area.”).
108. Id. at 14017.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 14017 (“[W]e find unavailing the reasons cited by the Fourth
Circuit (and some other courts) to support the interpretation that the statute
only limits localities from prohibiting all personal wireless services (i.e., a
blanket ban or ‘one-provider’ approach).”). Here, the FCC interestingly—and
somewhat confusingly—conflated both the one-provider rule and the blanketban rule. While these two are somewhat related, see supra notes 82–83 and
accompanying text, they are separate positions. A one-provider-rule jurisdiction
would not entertain an effective-prohibition challenge from a locality’s second
cellular provider whereas the Fourth Circuit would not entertain such a suit for
the second or even the first cellular provider because they interpret § 332(c)(7)
in a way that never applies to an individual denial in nearly any case. See supra
Part III.A.1.
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they are split as to whether to apply a no-alternative rule or the
least-intrusive rule.
1. The No-Alternative Rule
In the First and Seventh Circuits, a denied service provider
must demonstrate that its rejected site was the “only feasible
plan”111 and that “there are no alternative sites which would
solve”112 the coverage gap. The underlying reasoning of this rule
apparently is that the zoning board could not have instituted an
effective prohibition because there are other feasible sites that
the board would approve.113 If, however, the only viable location
still did not satisfy the board’s standards, then it has instituted a
policy with the effect of prohibiting towers generally. If the only
option is not good enough for the board, then there are no real
options.
2. The Least-Intrusive Rule
In the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, the courts
use a slightly different metric to compare the rejected site with
other potential sites in the area. Instead of considering the simple
question of whether other viable sites exist, these courts
determine whether the denied location is “the least intrusive on

111. Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 630
(1st Cir. 2002) (stating that an effective prohibition would exist “where the
plaintiff’s existing application is the only feasible plan; in that case, denial of the
plaintiff’s application might amount to prohibiting personal wireless service”
(citations and quotations omitted)); see also VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St.
Croix Cnty., 342 F.3d 818, 834–35 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Second Generation).
112. See Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635 (“An applicant for a zoning
permit arguing that there is an effective prohibition must still show that there
are no alternative sites which would solve the problem.”); see also VoiceStream,
342 F.3d at 834–35 (citing Second Generation).
113. Readers are ultimately left only to guess at the rationale because the
First and Seventh Circuits did not elaborate much about why they chose the noalternative rule. Rather, the two key decisions provide only a few sentences
regarding this issue and do not mention the fact that other circuits have used
another rule. See Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635; VoiceStream, 342 F.3d at
834–35.
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the values that the denial sought to serve.”114 This leads to a
somewhat lighter burden for rejected cellular providers115—or at
least a much more cabined analysis. Instead of the court
considering the broad, general question of whether any other
feasible options exist, the considerations are limited to the
grounds on which the denial purported to rest.116 For example, if
the zoning board’s denial decision stated that the proposed site
would ruin the view of a scenic mountain range, the zoning board
could not later argue that the proposed site did not provide
cellular reception to the other side of the county. The board
denied the application on aesthetic grounds, not on coverage
grounds. Instead, the court’s analysis would be focused on
whether there are any other sites in the county that would be less
disruptive of the scenic view; other concerns not raised by the
board in the initial denial would not be considered. The leastintrusive rule has the effect of holding a zoning board to its initial
reasoning, not allowing it to change arguments later.
D. The Effect of the FCC Ruling on the Circuit Splits
The FCC has taken a position on two of the three circuit
splits. It has interpreted subsection (B)(i)(II) to apply to even
single denials of zoning permits, thus siding against the Fourth
Circuit on the first split.117 The FCC has also found the own114. APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 480 (3d Cir.
1999); see also T-Moble Cent., LLC v. W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 808 (6th Cir.
2012) (“We agree with . . . and adopt the ‘least intrusive’ standard from the
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits.”); MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400
F.3d 715, 735 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e now adopt the ‘least intrusive means’
standard . . . .”); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir.
1999) (“A local government may reject an application for construction of a
wireless service facility in an under-served area without [violating subsection
(B)(i)(II)] if the service gap can be closed by less intrusive means.”).
115. See, e.g., MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734–35 (accepting the least-intrusive
standard over the no-alternative rule and stating that the First and Seventh
Circuits’ interpretations were “too exacting”).
116. See, e.g., APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 480 (“[T]he provider applicant
must also show that the manner in which it proposes to fill the significant gap
in service is the least intrusive on the values that the denial sought to serve.”).
117. See FCC Ruling, supra note 96, at 14017 (“[W]e find unavailing the
reasons cited by the Fourth Circuit (and some other courts) to support the
interpretation that the statute only limits localities from prohibiting all
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coverage rule to be better than the one-provider rule.118 Until
now, this Note has considered the FCC positions alongside the
circuits’ decisions as if they were of equal weight. However,
because of the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Arlington v.
FCC,119 it is possible that the FCC Ruling regarding these first
two issues has effectively overruled the circuits’ varying
positions.
City of Arlington was an appeal from a Fifth Circuit ruling120
that accepted the FCC’s interpretation of (B)(ii)’s “reasonable
period of time” requirement.121 The FCC Ruling at issue in this
case is the very same Ruling that took a position on the first two
circuit splits. The Court determined that (B)(ii) was ambiguous
and the FCC’s interpretation of it was reasonable, thus entitling
the Ruling to Chevron122 deference.123 However, it was not
personal wireless services (i.e., a blanket ban or ‘one-provider’ approach).”). See
also supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing the FCC’s criticism and
rejection of the one-provider rule).
118. See FCC Ruling, supra note 96, at 14016
We conclude that a State or local government that denies an
application for personal wireless service facilities siting solely
because one or more carriers serve a given geographic market has
engaged in unlawful regulation that prohibits or has the effect of
prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services within the
meaning of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
119. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
120. City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d 133 S. Ct.
1863 (2013).
121. Subsection (B)(ii) requires that zoning authorities respond applications
regarding cell towers to be addressed in a “reasonable period of time.” The FCC
Ruling had interpreted this to mean “presumptively, 90 days to process personal
wireless facility siting applications requesting collocations, and, also
presumptively, 150 days to process all other applications.” FCC Ruling, supra
note 96, at 14005.
122. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (“If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue . . . the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); see
also id. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative
interpretations.”).
123. See City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 247−54 (concluding that the FCC
Ruling, supra note 96, is entitled to Chevron deference, at least with respect to
the FCC’s interpretation of subsection (B)(ii) and “reasonable period of time”).
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entirely clear whether the FCC actually had the authority under
this statute to interpret the statute in the first place.124 Of course
the FCC thought that it had interpretive authority.125
Controversially, the Fifth Circuit gave the FCC Chevron
deference on this initial jurisdictional question, as well.126 Thus,
the Fifth Circuit ruled that the FCC’s determination of its own
interpretative authority was entitled to Chevron deference. This,
in turn, meant that the FCC’s interpretation of (B)(iii) could get
Chevron deference, as well.
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether agencies are entitled to Chevron deference on
interpretations of their own jurisdiction, and the Court ruled that
they in fact are.127 While City of Arlington will no doubt have a
great impact on administrative law generally, it also establishes
that the FCC Ruling at issue there—which is also the very same
Ruling in which the FCC considered the first two circuit splits—is
in fact entitled to Chevron deference despite the FCC’s
questionable interpretive authority. For the courts that disagree
with the FCC,128 City of Arlington puts them in the awkward
position of either applying their own circuit precedents or
applying Chevron. While this is an interesting question of
administrative law, it is beyond the scope of this Note. Part IV
attempts to demonstrate how the circuit splits should be solved
124. See, e.g., id. at 247–48 (considering the issue of whether the FCC has
authority to interpret § 332(c)(7) and ruling that, because the Fifth Circuit gives
agencies Chevron deference for determinations of their own authority, the FCC
does have authority to do so).
125. FCC Ruling, supra note 96, at 14000–03 (“We agree . . . that the
Commission has the authority to interpret Section 332(c)(7).”).
126. See City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 248 (“Some circuits apply Chevron
deference to disputes over the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction, some do not, and
some circuits have thus far avoided taking a position. In this circuit, we apply
Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction . . . .”
(citations omitted)). Up until now, this jurisdictional question had sometimes
been thought of as a “pre-Chevron” question. Id.
127. See City of Arlington, 113 S. Ct. at 1870–71 (describing the line
between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional agency interpretations as illusory,
and reaffirming that “the question in every case is, simply, whether the
statutory text forecloses the agency’s assertion of authority, or not”).
128. For the first split, the Fourth Circuit, which takes the “blanket ban”
approach. For the second split, the Second and Third Circuits, which take the
“one-provider” approach. See supra Parts III.A.1 and III.B.1, respectively.
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based on statutory interpretation, not how the splits might be
solved by agency law.
Table: Summary of Circuit Splits
First Circuit Split:
Can a single denial qualify as an effective prohibition?
No; blanket-ban-only rule: 4th
Circuit

Yes; apply two-pronged analysis:
1st, 2d, 3d, 6th, 7th, and 9th
Circuits; FCC; 5th indirectly via
Chevron deference

Second Circuit Split:
Can there be a significant gap if another cell provider is already
servicing the area?
No; one-provider rule: 2d and 3d
Circuits; 4th Circuit implicitly

Yes; own-coverage rule: 1st, 6th,
and 9th Circuits; FCC; 5th Circuit
indirectly via Chevron deference

Third Circuit Split:
What is the standard for considering alternative sites?
No-alternative rule: 1st and 7th
Circuits

Least-intrusive rule: 2d, 3d, 6th,
and 9th Circuits

IV. Analysis, Critique, and Recommendations
Now that the three circuit splits have been laid out and the
six potential answers have all been described, this Part moves on
to consider and analyze each of the splits in turn. This Part will
pay particular attention to the text of the Act itself as well as the
underlying policy motivations. Also, the analysis will use various
rational actor assumptions to attempt to predict the practical
outcomes should each of the various rules be adopted nationwide.
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A. First Split: Fourth Circuit vs. the Rest
The first circuit split is the threshold issue for the other two;
if one shares the Fourth Circuit’s view that a single denial can
never violate subsection (B)(i)(II) and that only blanket bans are
prohibited, then the next two circuit splits drop out of the
question entirely. If a single denial can never violate subsection
(B)(i)(II), then there is no need to even consider the two-pronged
analysis around which the other two splits revolve. Thus, it
makes sense to start untangling the splits by first considering the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City
Council of Virginia Beach.129
The court’s approach is laudable in that it was guided by a
desire to preserve local zoning authority to the fullest extent
possible;130 indeed, this is in the text of the statute itself.131 The
Act, however, does put limitations on local zoning authority.
That, too, is in the text of the Act.132 Subsection (B)(i)(II) is
undeniably one of those limitations.133 Local zoning authority is
preserved except to the extent that it “prohibit[s] or ha[s] the
effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.”134
This is where the Fourth Circuit errs, however. The court’s
blanket-ban-only rule and its refusal to apply subsection (B)(i)(II)
to individual denials effectively interprets away the phrase “or
have the effect of prohibiting.” This goes against the well-settled
canon of statutory construction that statutes are to be interpreted

129. 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).
130. See id. at 428–29 (“[O]ur reading simultaneously furthers the Act’s
explicit goals of . . . preserving a large portion of local authority by maintaining
that authority in particular cases.”); id. at 429 (“[B]ut this is necessary to avoid
destroying local authority.”).
131. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2012) (“Except as provided in this paragraph,
nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local
government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement,
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.”).
132. § 332(c)(7)(B) (providing, under the title “Limitations,” that “[t]he
regulation of the placement . . . of personal wireless service facilities by any
State or local government . . . (I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among
providers of functionally equivalent services; and (II) shall not prohibit or have
the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services”).
133. Id.
134. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
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so as to make every word carry some meaning and to avoid
rendering words superfluous.135
The Fourth Circuit was not unmindful of this critique and
defended against it in the AT&T decision. The court argued that
even if individual denials were not affected by subsection
(B)(i)(II), the provision could still be used to prohibit moratoria on
cell phone towers.136 The court went on to cite several examples of
subsection (B)(i)(II) being used for just such a purpose, striking
down blanket bans on any new towers in a given locality.137 This
argument entirely misses the point, however. The cell tower
moratoria to which the Fourth Circuit pointed would not need to
be struck down under the second, “or have the effect of” part of
subsection (B)(i)(II). Moratoria are not effective prohibitions, but
simply straight-up prohibitions. Such blatant violations of the Act
are already prohibited under the first portion of subsection
(B)(i)(II)—“shall not prohibit”—and the second clause would still
be unnecessary. The Fourth Circuit’s defense to this criticism is
completely inapposite, and in fact further demonstrates the
validity of the critique: the blanket-ban rule renders a crucial
part of the statute meaningless.
The flaws in the court’s reasoning do not end there, however.
The court also relied on false presumptions. The court stated that
“any reading of subsection (B)(i)(II) that allows the subsection to
apply to individual decisions would effectively nullify local
authority by mandating approval of all (or nearly all)

135. See, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is
our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute . . . .”
(citing Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))); Astoria Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991) (“But of course we construe
statutes, where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts
thereof.”).
136. AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423,
428 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he numerous cases involving local zoning authorities’
moratoria on new zoning permits demonstrate that the reading of the statute we
adopt today would hardly render the section of no use.”).
137. Id. (citing Lucas v. Planning Bd. of LaGrange, 7 F. Supp. 2d 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson Cnty., 968 F. Supp. 1457
(N.D. Ala. 1997); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of W. Seneca, 659 N.Y.S.2d 687
(Sup. Ct. 1997); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Farmington, No. 3:97 CV
863(GLG), 1997 WL 631104 (D. Conn. Oct. 6, 1997); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v.
City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash. 1996)).
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applications.”138 That is simply not true. Courts can review
individual zoning decisions without requiring approval by the
boards in every circumstance. Indeed, nearly every other circuit
in the nation has found a way to do just that. This is,
incidentally, the very purpose and effect of § 332(c)(7): to allow
aggrieved service providers to challenge adverse zoning decisions
in a federal court.139 In fact, why would the Act provide for such a
remedy to individual cellular service providers if it did not apply
to individual zoning decisions? For fear of adopting a rule that
would always require the cell phone companies to win at the
zoning board, the Fourth Circuit went on to adopt a rule in which
the cell phone companies would always lose in district court
challenges. There is certainly room for a middle path on this
issue, but the Fourth Circuit unfortunately was not able to find it
while every other circuit court has.
The court was undeniably correct in stating that the Act
“manifestly contemplates the ability of local authorities to ‘deny a
request.’”140 But, just because something can be permissible does
not mean that it always must be permissible. Again, this nuance
was also lost on the court.141 Moreover, it is not immediately
apparent just how many times a cell phone provider has to be
denied by a zoning board before subsection (B)(i)(II) is violated. If
a single denial will never suffice, would five denials be enough?
Maybe ten? In addition to faulty statutory interpretation, the
Fourth Circuit’s position is also inferior from a judicial economy
perspective. By never allowing a single denial to trigger
138. AT&T, 155 F.3d at 428.
139. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (“Any person adversely affected by any final action
or failure to act by a State or local government . . . may, within 30 days after
such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction.”).
140. AT&T, 155 F.3d at 428; see also § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (“Any decision by a
State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place,
construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and
supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.”).
141. AT&T, 155 F.3d at 428
[A]ny reading of subsection (B)(i)(II) that allows the subsection to
apply to individual decisions would effectively nullify local authority
by mandating approval of all (or nearly all) applications, a result
contrary to the explicit language of section (B)(iii), which manifestly
contemplates the ability of local authorities to “deny a request.”
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subsection (B)(i)(II), the Fourth Circuit’s rule encourages
frequent and successive petitions both to the zoning board—
testing new sites—and to the court—testing whether there is yet
enough evidence to convince the court of an effective ban.
The alternative to the Fourth Circuit’s position—the twopronged approach generally adopted by every other circuit that
has considered the issue142—is based on simple logic. It only
stands to reason that if there is a gap in cellular reception and
even the most ideal site for a cell phone tower is rejected (say, in
a secluded area, able to be disguised into the landscape, yet still
solving a significant dead zone), then any other and lesser sites
would also be rejected. If even the best is not good enough, then
nothing is good enough. If nothing is good enough, then the
zoning board’s impossibly high standards are effectively a ban on
cell phone towers. A denial of a single application, if based on
such a stringent policy, can evince an effective prohibition.
One could argue that the two-pronged approach—and the
two circuit splits that have formed around it—is somewhat more
complicated than the six simple words, “or have the effect of
prohibiting.” Indeed, the interpretation does seem to read a lot
into that short phrase, perhaps stretching it into something more
unwieldy. To some extent, however, we should expect
interpretations to do this—to explain, explicate, and unpack a
statute. Rarely does an interpretation result in a shorter rule or
fewer words, but rather an elaboration with a finer, more
particularized meaning. That is precisely what interpretation is,
and this is what the two-pronged approach entails. Moreover, it is
derived from the plain meaning of the statutory language and,
unlike the Fourth Circuit’s rule, it does not render parts of the
Act meaningless. For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit’s overly
constrained rule ought to be rejected in favor of the general twopronged approach. This does not end the inquiry, however, as
there are two more circuit splits to consider.

142.

See supra Part III.A.2.
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B. The Second Split: One-Provider Rule vs. Own-Coverage Rule
To analyze this second split between the one-provider and
own-coverage rules, recall the hypothetical scenario provided in
Part III.B.: AT&T is looking to build a new tower in a town that
is not yet served by AT&T, but is served by an already-existing
Verizon tower. If AT&T’s zoning application was rejected by the
local board, the one-provider rule would preclude the company’s
subsection (B)(v) effective-prohibition suit because the area is
already served by Verizon. If the board is nonetheless willing to
allow this second tower, then it of course is free to allow AT&T to
build it. One-provider jurisdictions just will not require the board
to approve AT&T’s application. In this sense, the one-provider
rule leaves more room for local authority over tower siting, and
thus could be seen as more in line with the text of § 332(c)(7):
“Except as otherwise provided . . . , nothing in this chapter shall
limit or affect the authority of a State or local government . . .
over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and
modification of personal wireless service facilities.”143 However,
the operative phrase there is “[e]xcept as otherwise provided,”
and we are indeed considering and analyzing one of the
exceptions explicitly laid out in the statute; namely, subsection
(B)(i)(II). Just as preservation of local authority is one of the
underlying policies of the Act,144 so is fostering a national
telecommunications infrastructure.145 Section 332(c)(7) takes
local authority and tempers it with limitations designed to serve
national interests, and one of these limits is the issue at hand.
Thus, the increased deference to local zoning authority is a strong
argument in favor of the one-provider rule, but this does not
necessarily trump. The analysis must also include other factors.
In adopting the one-provider rule, the Second and Third
Circuits stressed the fact that the “focus [of § 332(c)(7)] is on the
143. § 332(c)(7)(A).
144. See id. (“Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter
shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless service facilities.”); see also § 332(c)(7)
(section entitled “Preservation of local zoning authority”).
145. See supra Part II.B. for a discussion of the local–national balance
struck by § 332(c)(7).
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remote users’ access to the national telephone network.”146 As
long as residents of the locality can receive telecommunications
from even just one provider, subsection (B)(i)(II)’s goal is
fulfilled.147 Thus, the one-provider rule purports to be more
consumer-centric view, at least in terms of initial perspective.
However, the rule may not be consumer-friendly in terms of its
effects on the market. The rule implicitly—if not explicitly—
allows for a monopoly. As long as one provider already serves the
market (Verizon in the above hypothetical), the next cell phone
company is not guaranteed the opportunity to also serve the area
(AT&T). While zoning boards in one-provider jurisdictions can
presumably allow in second entrants if they want, there is no
reason to think that localities would be eager to do so, especially
given the strong not-in-my-back-yard pressures.148 Thus, if one
assumes that zoning authorities will usually deny towers that
they are not required to accept, initial providers like Verizon will
be able to maintain a monopoly. This one-participant market
would be upheld, ironically, pursuant to the antimonopolistic
TCA, an act with the express purpose of “opening all
telecommunications markets to competition.”149 Therefore, the
one-provider rule would lead to practical outcomes that are the
exact opposite of the clearly stated legislative intent of the Act.
These monopoly problems would only be exacerbated by the
“crazy patchwork quilt” that the First Circuit was rightly
concerned with in Second Generation Properties, L.P. v. Town of
Pelham.150 There, the court worried that various one-provider
pockets “might have the effect of driving the industry toward a

146. APT Pittsburgh, Ltd. P’ship v. Penn. Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 479 (3d Cir.
1999); see also Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir. 1999)
(using the remote users’ perspective in adopting the one-provider rule (cited in
APT Pittsburgh)).
147. See, e.g., MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 731–32
(9th Cir. 2005) (describing the Second and Third Circuits’ position: “as long as
some provider offers service in the area, consumers will be adequately
served . . . . Under this view, the [Act] protects only the individual user’s ability
to receive service from one provider or another . . . ”).
148. See supra Part II.A.
149. H. REP. No. 104-458 at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124.
150. 313 F.3d 620, 633 (1st Cir. 2002).
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single carrier.”151 Whether this would actually lead to a singleparticipant market nationally is unclear, but that is certainly a
possibility. What is clear, however, is that the one-provider rule
would allow for many single-participant markets locally, perhaps
changing from town to town. This is because the provider in a
given locality would be determined by which cell phone company
won the race to get the first—and only—zoning board approval.
While residents of each town will most likely know which cell
phone company is the only one with coverage in the area, this
does not really address why people want cell phones. “If your car
breaks down somewhere where there is a gap in your wireless
service, it won’t matter that there is another service provider in
that area. That person will be unable to call for help . . . .”152
Allowing such balkanized enclaves of cell reception for just one
provider each totally undercuts the very purpose for a nationwide
cellular infrastructure in the first place. People want cell phones
to give them the ability to make a call from anywhere, not just
their hometown. Thus, the one-provider rule would establish not
just monopoly markets, but an entire series of monopoly markets,
each dominated by a different provider. The own-coverage rule,
however, would counteract these monopolistic tendencies by
allowing any competitor to get a foothold in any new market,
assuming, of course, that the new entrant can find a tower site
that meets the other qualifications. In this respect, the owncoverage rule is preferable and more in-line with the legislative
intent of the Act.
The fundamental trade-off here is the desire for a competitive
market with multiple service providers (carrier-friendly owncoverage rule) versus having as few towers in a locality as
possible, perhaps even just one tower (zoning-board-friendly oneprovider rule). Before one can conclude that one of these is better
than the other, it is worth attempting to devise solutions that
151. Id. at 633.
152. Chani Katzen, High Court Declines Phone-Tower Case Newtown
Township Wants the Structure Removed Now. Omnipoint Was Challenging an
Appeals
Court
Ruling.,
PHILA.
INQUIRER,
Nov.
7,
2000,
http://articles.philly.com/2000-11-07/news/25613548_1_phone-tower-phonetower-cellular-telecommunications-industry-association (quoting an attorney for
Omnipoint Communications after a failed writ of certiorari petition in
Omnipoint Commc’s Enters. v. Newtown Twp., 219 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied 531 U.S. 985 (2000)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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sidestep this dilemma. Essentially, we should try to have the
cake and eat it too. One possibility for this is co-location, which is
putting multiple carriers’ signal-receiving equipment on the same
tower,153 to the extent that this is technologically feasible.154
Typically, the tower owner will allow other cellular providers to
place their equipment there on the same tower in exchange for
rental payments or some sort of licensing agreement.155
At first glance, this seems to offer the perfect solution to the
intractable monopoly problems with the one-provider rule. Such a
jurisdiction could still have multiple carriers offering cellular
service if they all simply co-located on the same tower. While this
seems to neutralize the monopoly issue, it actually just shifts it
behind the scenes. Instead of a monopoly on the provision of
cellular service to consumers, there is now a monopoly on the
provision of tower facilities to other competing carriers. With the
one-provider rule allowing localities to prohibit second towers, the
new entrant to the market has absolutely no bargaining power
when negotiating for the rights to co-locate on the one existing
tower.156 Relatedly, there is little if any, downward pressure on
153. See Long, supra note 20, at 386 (defining co-location as the “placement
of more than one company’s antennas on a single tower”); see also Omnipoint
Commc’s, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(considering a case in which a local zoning board denied an application to colocate another carrier’s receiving equipment on a preexisting tower and ruling
that the denial was in violation of § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) because it unreasonably
discriminated against equivalent services); Timothy L. Gustin, The Perpetual
Growth and Controversy of the Cellular Superhighway: Cellular Tower Siting
and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1001, 1029
(1997) (advocating for a co-location amendment to the TCA to “require
competing cellular providers to share the same cellular tower when
technologically feasible”).
154. Depending on the circumstances, certain frequencies between carriers
could cause interference with each other. See, e.g., Gustin, supra note 153, at
1029 n.173 (“Collocation [sic] would not be feasible when it creates frequency
interference, known as intermodulation.” (citations omitted)); Long, supra note
20, at 386–87 (“Co-location is limited by one technical constraint, however:
Antennas placed too close together cause interference. Thus, only a limited
number of antennas can coexist on one tower without reducing service quality.”).
155. See, e.g., Gustin, supra note 153, at 1029 n.176 and accompanying text
(describing the differences between a lease, sublease, and license in such colocation agreements).
156. At this point, one might suggest the possibility of the zoning board
requiring consent to co-location as a prerequisite to approval. However, a few
problems arise regarding the price. If none is set and the consent must be to free
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the incumbent tower-owner’s asking price. If the second
(attempted) market entrant is not willing to pay the exorbitantly
high rental, maybe the third or fourth entrants will.157 These new
carriers will surely pass the increased costs on to their new
customers in the locality, thereby providing even more market
advantages to the initial carrier. Or, if no other cell phone
company is willing to pay the high rent, it may not be any loss to
the incumbent carrier as they can make up any lost rental
revenue through higher rates on their captive customers. The
initial carrier would have a monopoly, after all; where else would
the customers go? Thus, we see that, even with co-location as a
possibility, the one-provider rule will still tend towards
monopolies against the obvious intent of the statute.
On the other hand, the own-coverage rule would actually
encourage co-location. A second entrant to the market would have
the choice between building their own new tower or co-locating
and paying rent to the incumbent carrier. This choice provided to
co-location, then the initial builder of the tower would necessarily bear all upfront costs associated with building the tower (which surely would get passed
along to their paying customers), while the new, co-locating entrants would get
to ride free. If a price is set in the board-imposed co-location consent, then there
is still no guarantee that it is an efficient price. If the price is too low, there still
will be a first-mover/free-rider problem, and if it is too high, then the initial
carrier will still dominate the provision of cell phone service in that locality. The
co-location price would most likely be better set by a market in which a second
entrant has the choice of co-locating or building a new tower; this could be done
by adoption of the own-coverage rule (see infra pp. 2017–18 for further
explanation).
157. One might suggest that cell phone companies do have an incentive to
offer fair, reasonable prices to one another, even if the later entrants are forced
to co-locate rather than build a new tower. In a market with a few large
participants, there indeed could be some downward pressure on rentals. For
example, if AT&T charges a high price for Verizon’s co-location in Town A,
Verizon would easily turn around and overcharge AT&T for its proposed colocation in Town B. Thus, with a few repeat players who are each dominant in
their own localities determined essentially at random (i.e., whoever built the
first tower), there could be an incentive to “play nice.” One could even foresee
national agreements between large carriers like Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and
the like to set reasonable rental prices for co-location. However, encouraging
such agreements could easily have oligopolistic tendencies, allowing the larger
firms to squeeze out smaller competitors who do not have many (or any)
preexisting towers on which to offer low co-location rentals. Instead of relying on
such post hoc fixes to the problems inherent with the one-provider rule, it is
better to adopt the own-coverage rule that directly encourages a fair, marketbased co-location price-setting at the outset (see below for further explanation).
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the second entrant would serve as an upper limit to what the first
tower-owner could charge in a lease or license. If the asking price
is more than the costs associated with zoning and building a
second tower, no rational actor would sign on to such an
agreement. Therefore, the first carriers would be incentivized to
not monopolistically overcharge their competitors, but to offer a
price that second entrants might actually take. In this sense, the
own-coverage rule should lead to more co-location and fewer
towers total by setting a fair, market-based price while
simultaneously avoiding the monopoly problems of the oneprovider rule. Thus, the own-coverage rule is preferable, not
because it is better to side with the cell phone companies over
local zoning boards, but rather because the rule incentivizes colocation. This leads to the most optimal outcome for both sides—
better reception for more carriers with fewer towers.
C. Third Split: No-Alternative Rule vs. Least-Intrusive Rule
The third and final circuit split concerns the metric by which
other potential sites are judged. The first of the two possible rules
asks the court to answer the incredibly broad question of whether
the rejected site was the “only feasible plan”158 or if “there [were
other] alternative sites which would solve”159 the coverage gap.160
While this phrasing of the rule keeps with the general approach
of the two-pronged analysis, the main problem with this
interpretation is that it is too general. The court is posed with the
broad and subjective question of what other options are available
and whether they are more feasible, with no guidance as to what
actually constitutes feasibility. Such an open-ended question not
158. Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 630
(1st Cir. 2002) (stating that an effective prohibition would exist “where the
plaintiff’s existing application is the only feasible plan; in that case, denial of the
plaintiff’s application might amount to prohibiting personal wireless service”
(citations and quotations omitted)); see also VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St.
Croix Cnty., 342 F.3d 818, 834–35 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Second Generation).
159. Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635 (“An applicant for a zoning permit
arguing that there is an effective prohibition must still show that there are no
alternative sites which would solve the problem.”); see also VoiceStream, 342
F.3d at 834–35 (citing Second Generation).
160. See supra Part III.B.1.
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only leaves the court with nowhere to begin the analysis, but also
leaves it with nowhere to end. With this rule, the court could
consider any—rather, would have to consider every—possible
factor in tower siting. This leaves the inquiry overly broad and
needlessly complicates the litigation. Moreover, the noalternative rule, by its own terms, seeks to find the one best
potential tower site out of the vast array of possible ones in the
locality.161 Searching for some hypothetical best site—in the
formal, cumbersome, and expensive litigation context, no less—is
surely a fool’s errand.
Making similar observations, the Ninth Circuit has critiqued
the no-alternative rule because it is “too exacting.”162 The court
noted that when there are several other viable sites (assuming, of
course, that the court could come up with a workable definition of
viability), the no-alternative rule “would either preclude the
construction of any facility (since no single site is the ‘only viable’
alternative) or require providers to endure repeated denials by
local authorities until only one feasible alternative remained.”163
Thus, this rule could run into the same pragmatic and judicial
economy concerns raised regarding the Fourth Circuit’s blanketban rule.164
The least-intrusive rule, however, avoids many of these
problems. First, it narrows the range of possible factors to be
considered by the court.165 Instead of being able to consider
anything and everything relating to the feasibility of the site, the
court would only need to consider those factors mentioned in the
denial itself.166 This gives a reviewing court a clear place to begin
161. The rule’s own terms lead to this because if a rejected site has no
alternatives, then it is, by definition, the best possible site. See Second
Generation, 313 F.3d at 635 (“An applicant for a zoning permit arguing that
there is an effective prohibition must still show that there are no alternative
sites which would solve the problem.” (emphasis added)); see also VoiceStream,
342 F.3d at 834–35 (citing Second Generation).
162. MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 734 (9th Cir.
2005).
163. Id.
164. See supra Part IV.A.
165. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (describing how the leastintrusive rule narrows the court’s inquiry).
166. See, e.g., MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 435 (“The Second and Third Circuits
require the provider to show that ‘the manner in which it proposes to fill the
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and end the analysis: read the denial letter, consider the factors
used, and, using the reasoning of the zoning board, determine if
the rejected site was still the least intrusive on those grounds.
Presumably, the least-intrusive rule would still require the court
to consider other potential sites to see if the rejected one is really
the least intrusive, but at least those factors used would be
limited to only those factors mentioned in the denial.
The least-intrusive rule takes the zoning decision seriously
and binds the board to the rationale it purported to use in the
initial denial. This holds the board accountable for what it said
below and makes sure that the reasoning is logical and
consistent. Such accountability is desirable in this situation
because localities might otherwise be tempted to reject cell towers
for purely not-in-my-back-yard reasoning167 and then come up
with other pretextual excuses in the formal written denials. If on
review the court determines that the rejected site was actually
the least intrusive on the purported values used by the board,
then the site would be approved. Under a no-alternative test, in
which the court can consider any factors relating to feasibility, a
locality’s pretextual denial may otherwise be upheld on other
grounds that they did not consider and rely on in their decision.
On a similar note, the least-intrusive rule would prevent the
locality from changing its argument against approval of the site
midway through the application–litigation process. Operating in
a way similar to estoppel,168 the board could not argue one
rationale in the denial letter and then another completely
different (presumably stronger) rationale when challenged before
the court. Under the no-alternative rule, the board would have a
much broader field of possible arguments to make when the
denial is challenged in court. Moreover, service providers would
significant gap in service is the least intrusive on the values that the denial
sought to serve.’” (quoting APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d
469, 480 (3d Cir. 1999)).
167. See supra Part II.A.
168. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 495 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“estoppel” as “[a] bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that
contradicts what one has said or done before or what has been legally
established as true”); id. at 496 (defining “judicial estoppel” as “[e]stoppel that
prevents a party from contradicting previous declarations made during the same
or an earlier proceeding if the change in position would adversely affect the
proceeding or constitute a fraud on the court”).
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not know what arguments they should expect to face. This all
gives the locality an unfair tactical advantage. That is, unless the
zoning board is required to continue to rely on the same rationale
they purported to use, as the least-intrusive rule does.
Finally, the least-intrusive rule is preferable to the noalternative rule because it fits better with the overall structure of
the Act, particularly how it leaves most of the substantive
decisionmaking in the hands of the local zoning boards. Under
§ 332(c)(7), the court’s role is not necessarily to delve into the
substance of the underlying zoning decision. Instead, the court is
simply to make sure that the local zoning authority has complied
with the limitations stated in § 332(c)(7)(B),169 namely that the
local authority has not unreasonably discriminated between
providers170 and that the zoning board has not instituted a ban or
effective ban on cellular services.171 If local zoning authority, by
and large, is to be preserved,172 then the weighing of competing
options and subjective considerations of feasibility should be done
at zoning board meetings, not in courtrooms. Instead, the noalternative rule invites courts to go beyond the stated reasoning
of the denial and to consider any and every factor that could help
the court identify other feasible tower sites.173 At least with the
169. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (2012) (“Any person adversely affected by
any final action or failure to act by a State or local government . . . that is
inconsistent with this subparagraph may . . . commence an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction.”).
170. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) (“The regulation of . . . personal wireless service
facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof . . . shall
not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent
services.”).
171. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (“The regulation of . . . personal wireless service
facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof . . . shall
not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless
services.”).
172. See § 332(c)(7)(A) (“Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in
this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless service facilities.”).
173. See, e.g., MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 734 (9th
Cir. 2005) (rejecting a proposed “most acceptable option” rule which operated
similar to the no-alternative rule, stating that it “seems a hopelessly subjective
standard, and one wonders how a proposed site could ever be proven ‘the most
acceptable’ . . . ”). The argument that the Ninth Circuit used to reject the “most
acceptable option” rule applies just the same to the no-alternative rule. It is an
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least-intrusive test, the court would be limited in its substantive
considerations to those on which the zoning board based its
decision.
To continue the administrative law analogy from earlier,174
the substantial evidence standard largely prohibits courts from
engaging in their own fact-finding, both in the administrative
context175 and in subsection (B)(v) actions.176 The no-alternative
rule, which is not limited to the rationale of the denial but open to
boundless considerations, allows the court to consider evidence
beyond the record from the zoning board below (that is, the
denial) and to actively weigh the substantive considerations. This
would all but require the court to make its own subjective
judgment calls as to whether there are any other feasible
alternatives. Under the least-intrusive rule, however, the court is
limited in its considerations. Just as federal courts in
administrative review actions are limited to the record that was
in front of the agency at the time,177 the court in these subsection
open-ended, subjective question that seeks to find one possible site out of vast
array of options.
174. See supra Part II.C.
175. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . .
unsupported by substantial evidence in a case . . . reviewed on the record.”); 5
U.S.C. § 556(e) (“The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all
papers and requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the exclusive record for
decision.” (emphasis added)); see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S.
729, 743–44 (1985) (“The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate
[standard of review] to the agency decision based on the record the agency
presents to the reviewing court.”); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)
(“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record
already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing
court.”).
176. See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d
Cir. 1999) (“[W]e may neither engage in our own fact-finding nor supplant the
Town Board’s reasonable determinations.” (citing PrimeCo Pers. Commc’ns, L.P.
v. Vill. of Fox Lake, F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1998))); T-Mobile Cent.,
LLC v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty., 546 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“[A] reviewing court has no power to substitute its own conclusions for those of
the fact-finder.” (citations and quotations omitted)); Ostrow, supra note 48, at
333 (“Though the substantial evidence standard is less deferential than the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, it does not substitute local
judgments with those of the judiciary.”).
177. See, e.g., IMS, P.C. v. Alvarez, 129 F.3d 618, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“It is
a widely accepted principle of administrative law that the courts base their
review of an agency’s actions on the materials that were before the agency at the
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(B)(v) actions would be limited to what the board based its
decision on.
V. Conclusion
The siting of cell phone towers—and thus the provision of
cellular reception generally178—is a collective action problem and,
in particular, is often fraught with the not-in-my-back-yard
phenomenon.179 While opposition to a tower in view of one’s
bedroom window is certainly understandable, so is the desire to
have cellular reception wherever one goes. In an attempt to
resolve the underlying tension, Congress adopted the § 332(c)(7)
tower siting regime which balances the local and national
interests involved by not directly making siting decisions but
rather by regulating the overall process.180 One key provision of
this statutory scheme—subsection (B)(i)(II)—has been plagued
with three interrelated circuit splits which this Note has
examined in detail.181 After analysis and critique, this Note has
concluded that the Fourth Circuit’s blanket-ban rule should be
rejected because it interprets away half of the clause and renders
its provisions meaningless. Instead, the general two-pronged
approach employed by nearly every other circuit should be
adopted because it provides clear, logical meaning to all of the
words of the subsection.182 Within this general framework, the
own-coverage rule, while restricting the local zoning boards’
authority with respect to second market entrants, nevertheless
encourages efficient co-location of multiple carriers on one
tower—the solution that ultimately achieves both fewer tower
sites as well as increased reception and market competition.183
Finally, the least-intrusive rule is preferable to the no-alternative
rule because it focuses the litigation specifically on why the
zoning board made their decision rather than opening the judicial
time its decision was made.” (citations omitted)).
178. See supra note 1.
179. See supra Part II.A.
180. See supra Part II.B.
181. See supra Part III.
182. See supra Part IV.A.
183. See supra Part IV.B.
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proceedings so wide as to allow the court to substitute their own
substantive decision; also, concerns regarding judicial economy
and tactical equity also favor the least-intrusive rule, as well.184
Thus, when one considers the text, intent, and underlying policies
of § 332(c)(7), as well as the practical effects of each of the
alternatives, the final interpretation of effective prohibition
under subsection (B)(i)(II) is reached: When a cellular provider
can show a significant gap in its own coverage and the denied site
is the least intrusive on the grounds which the denial sought to
serve, there has been an effective prohibition of cellular services.

184.

See supra Part IV.C.

